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INTRODUCTION
Recent technological advancements in media have spurned
unprecedented growth in the ever-changing industries of music,
television and motion pictures. Over 22 million Americans ages 18—
39 own portable MP3 players or iPods®.1 In fact, 19% of all
Americans under the age of 30 own these relatively new devices.2
Millions of Americans watch digitally recorded television programs or
movies thanks to “On-Demand” services such as TiVo®, Digital Video
Recorders or VHS tapes.3 In fact, countless numbers of people have
recorded their favorite movie or television program on a VHS or

*

J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Lee Rainie, PIP Comments: iPods and MPS Players Storm the Market, PEW
INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, February 14, 2005,
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/p/1047/pipcomments.asp (last visited April 15,
2006).
2
Id.
3
BILL ROSE & JOE LENSKI, ARBITRON/EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH, INTERNET
AND MULTIMEDIA 2005: THE ON-DEMAND MEDIA CONSUMER (2005), available at
http://www.edisonresearch.com/home/archives/Internet%202005%20Summary%20
Final.pdf (last visited June 25, 2006).
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Betamax video tape daily since the United States Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.4
However great these technological advancements have impacted
the American economy by making entertainment more readily
available to consumers and creating additional markets for producers,
these advancements have also threatened – and continue to threaten –
the delicate balance between rights in copyrighted material and
technological innovation. This article, inspired by the Seventh
Circuit’s recent decision in BMG Music v. Gonzalez5, analyzes this
balance, and looks toward the future of the relationship between
copyright law and technological advancement in the Seventh Circuit.
First, this Article will present a brief history of copyright law in
the United States, which has been forced to evolve as newer and more
efficient technologies have developed. With the advent of these new
technologies, such as peer-to-peer file sharing networks, iPods and
MP3 players, right-holders of copyrighted material face unrestricted
and widespread dissemination of their works. However, the public’s
use of copyrighted material through peer-to-peer file sharing networks
(P2P) has upset this delicate balance between the rights owners
possess in their works and the benefit of open and public access to
them as a result of the overwhelming efficiency in dissemination that
this technology offers.
Second, this article examines the recent Gonzalez decision, the
apex of this conflict on an individual level in the Seventh Circuit.
Companies such as BMG, the plaintiff in Gonzalez, have become
increasingly weary of sophisticated infringement technologies such as
P2P file sharing networks, and have begun to target individual
copyright infringers such as Cecilia Gonzalez.
Lastly, this article will address the problems the recording
industries and consumers face in the years to come when dealing with
online music access. The impossibility of litigating each and every
case against every individual infringer, or even filing suit against every
infringer, is readily apparent to the majority of internet users, thereby
4
5

464 U.S. 417 (1984).
430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
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fostering an “it will not happen to me” attitude in the minds of the P2P
communities. Finding the right remedy to this problem can eliminate
copyright infringement in P2P file sharing communities and,
hopefully, will enable this technology to benefit both sides of the
conflict.
HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

I.

A. The Early Days of Copyright Law
The Constitution of the United States provides Congress with the
power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”6 The Copyright Act of 1790 granted
American authors the right to print, re-print or publish their work for
fourteen years and to renew that protection for an additional fourteen
years.7 The Copyright Act sought to provide an incentive to authors,
artists, and scientists to create original works by providing creators
with a monopoly; however, this monopoly was limited in order to
“stimulate creativity and the advancement of science and the arts
through wide public access of the works . . .”8
In 1841, the Massachusetts Supreme Court heard a dispute
brought by the owner and editor of a collection of George
Washington’s letters after those letters were used by an author in a
book about Washington’s life.9 Justice Story, delivering the opinion
for the Court, found that the author had infringed on the owner’s
copyright when he published a large number of these letters in his
book.10 The author argued that his use of the letters was justified and
6

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Association of Research Libraries, Washington D.C., A History of Copyright
Law in the United States, (2002), www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/timeline.html (last
visited June 25, 2006).
8
Id. (emphasis added).
9
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841).
10
Folsom, 9 F. Cas at 349.
7
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that he had a right to use the letters for his original work.11 Justice
Story disagreed, holding that if so much of a work is taken “that the
value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the
original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by
another, that is sufficient . . . to constitute piracy pro tanto.”12
Further, the court held that the question of piracy depends upon
the balance of:
the comparative use made in one of the materials of the
other; the nature, extent and value of the materials thus
used; the objects of each work; and the degree to which
each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to
the same common sources of information, or to have
exercised the same common diligence in the selection
and arrangement of the materials.13
In 1909, Congress revised the Copyright Act of 1790 and for the
first time addressed the rights a composer holds in his music. The
main purpose, Congress said, was:
in expanding copyright protection accorded to music
has been to give the composer an adequate return for
the value of his composition, and it has been a serious
and difficult task to combine the protection of the
composer with the protection of the public, and to so
frame an act that it would accomplish the double
purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return
for all use made of his composition and at the same
time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies,
which might be founded upon the very rights granted to
the composer for the purpose of protecting his rights.14
11

Id. at 342-44.
Id. at 348.
13
Id. at 344.
14
Association of Research Libraries, supra note 7.
12
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B. Moving Toward the Modern Years
This “difficult task” recognized by Congress in 1909 would only
increase with the development of new technology. In 1973, the
photocopier made its way into the realm of copyright law. In Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States,15 the National Institutes of Health and
the National Library of Medicine photocopied articles in medical
journals published by plaintiff and gave them to physicians and
medical researchers for use in their professional work.16 The Court of
Claims opined that medical research and medicine in general would be
harmed if this were found to be infringement.17 In the decision, Judge
Davis, while pleading for congressional treatment of this new
technology in copyright law, held that that use of the photocopier to
copy this important medical information constituted fair use, but also
specifically noted that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any harm from its
use.18
This “fair” use the Supreme Court talked about was a major part
of the revisions included in the Copyright Act of 1976. This Act
superseded all previous copyright law and was brought about in part
because of new technological advancements and their impact on what
might be copyrighted.19 This revision codified for the first time the
“fair use” doctrine, and also extended copyright to unpublished
works.20
The “fair use” doctrine provides that the “fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
15

480 F. 2d 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
Williams, 480 F. 2d at 1347-48.
17
Id. at 1354.
18
Id. at 1353-54.
19
Association of Research Libraries, supra note 7.
20
Id.
16
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infringement of copyright.”21 Four factors are determinative of
whether an act constitutes fair use: the purpose and character of the
use, nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the whole, and the effect of the use on
the potential market.22 This doctrine is subject to interpretation for
each specific case before a court.23 Because of that, its application is
difficult, and both the legislature and the courts have recognized as
much:
The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107
offers some guidance to users in determining when the
principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless
variety of situations and combinations of circumstances
that can rise in particular cases precludes the
formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial
doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of
rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad
statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the
criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case
basis.24
C. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.
When Sony introduced the Betamax to the market in 1975, this
case-specific nature of the fair use doctrine would play a major role in
the advancement of this new technology. Industry heads feared that it,
and subsequent VCR technology, would encourage consumers to copy
and “library” movies and programs from television, “thereby reducing
21

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Id.
23
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).
24
Sony, 464 U.S. at 450 (1984).
22
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the demand for future syndication of these programs.”25 In fact, the
head of the Motion Picture Association of America at the time, Jack
Valenti, famously testified in 1982 to the House of Representatives
that “the VCR is to the American film producer and the American
public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”26
It did not take long for the Courts to become involved in the
Betamax conflict. In 1979, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California heard argument and ruled in the case of
Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America.27 Because of the
importance of this case, it and its subsequent decisions in the United
States Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court will be
discussed at length.
In Sony, plaintiff Universal Studios alleged that the use of the
Betamax to record telecasts and to copy audio-visual material to be
viewed at a later time infringed on its copyrights and that Sony was
either a direct or contributory infringer for distributing the Betamax to
individual consumers.28 Universal sought injunctive relief to prevent
any future copyright infringement.29
25

Fred von Lohmann, iPods, Tivo and Fair Use as Innovation Policy,
Presented at the 2005 Fordham Intellectual Property Conference (March 31-April 1,
2005), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/courses/fall05/ipscholarship/Von%20Lo
hmann%20Fair%20Use%20As%20Innovation%20Policy.pdf at 10 (last visited June
25, 2006).
26
Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982) (statement of
Jack Valenti), available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm (last visited June 25,
2006).
27
480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
28
Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 432.
Curiously, before Sony was filed, Universal Studios began marketing its
products on pre-recorded discs and planned to release these discs before and after the
pictures were released. Id. at 433. Perhaps Universal Studios was concerned with
Sony’s entrance into the home-video market; alleging and proving copyright
infringement could have been a way to monopolize its new dissemination tactic.
29
Id. at 442.
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Sony marketed the Betamax as a device capable of recording
favorite programs or building a library of recorded works.30 Its
advertising strategy also suggested to the public that it record “novels
for television” and “classic movies.”31 None of the advertisements
warned the public that recording copyrighted shows could constitute
infringement.32 However, the Betamax instruction booklet did make it
known that “[t]elevision programs, films, videotapes and other
materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of such
material may be contrary to the provisions of the United States
copyright laws.”33
Both Universal Studios and Sony conducted surveys regarding the
usage of the Betamax.34 Some notable findings revealed that:
•
75.4% of owners use their machines to record for timeshifting purposes half or most of the time. Sony’s survey showed that
96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs
they otherwise would have missed.35
•
55.8% of users said there were 10 or fewer tapes in
their possession. In Sony’s survey, of the total programs viewed by
interviewees, 70.4% had been viewed only that one time and for
57.9%, there were no plans for further viewing.36
•
According to Universal Studio’s survey, 58.3% of the
owners eliminate commercials from the recording either “sometimes,”
“rarely,” or “never”; 56.1% use the fast-forward function to pass
commercials either “sometimes,” “rarely,” or “never.” Defendant’s
interviewees bypassed commercials 24.6% of the time.37

30

Id. at 436.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 438.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 439.
31
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•
83.2% of the interviewees reported that their frequency
of going to the theatre to view movies was unaffected by the
Betamax.38
Universal conceded that the Betamax had not harmed its business
relationships nor caused it any economic damage.39 Further, expert
testimony presented by Universal was inconclusive as to when or after
what amount of sales the Betamax would cause Universal any
recognizable harm.40
Before rendering its opinion, the District Court opined that:
[t]he ramifications of this new technology are greater
than the boundaries of this lawsuit. A court reviewing the
limited claims of specified parties in a particular factual
setting cannot and should not undertake the role of a
government commission or legislative body exploring and
evaluating all the uses and consequences of the videotape
recorder.41
After a lengthy discussion of the Copyright Act of 1909 (of which
some of the alleged infringement were governed), the Copyright Act
of 1976 (which governed the remaining infringements), and the fair
use doctrine, the court found that the 1971 Amendment to the 1909
Copyright Act permitted home use audio recording.42 In fact, the court
cited congressional discussions regarding this Amendment, one of
which speaks volumes to the subject here. The Court’s citation of the
discussion is as follows:
When the 1971 Amendment reached the House floor,
the question of noncommercial home recording was
38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 442.
42
Id. at 444.
39
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raised by Representative Kazen of Texas and answered
by Representative Kastenmeier. Representative
Kastenmeier was chairman of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee responsible for the New Act, a sponsor
of the general revision legislation, and a member of the
Conference Committee which put the New Act in final
form. The dialogue was as follows:
MR. KAZEN. Am I correct in assuming that the bill
protects copyrighted material that [i]s duplicated for
commercial purposes only?
MR. KASTENMEIER. Yes.
MR. KAZEN. In other words, if your child were to
Record off of a program which comes through the air
on [t]he radio or Television, and then used it for her
own personal pleasure, for listening pleasure, this
would not be included under the penalties of this bill?
MR. KASTENMEIER. This is not included in the bill.
I am glad the gentleman raises the point.
On page 7 of the report, under “Home Recordings,”
Members will note that under the bill the same practice
which prevails today is called for; namely, [t]his is
considered both presently and under the proposed law
to be fair use. The child does not do this for commercial
purposes. This is made clear in the report.43
This legislative history, the court noted, evidences “that, in
balance, Congress did not find that protection of copyright holders’
rights over reproduction of their works was worth the privacy and
enforcement problems which restraint of home-use recording would
43

Id. at 446.
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create.”44 This, the court held, was further evidence that the 1909 and
1976 Copyright Acts permitted, under the fair use doctrine, home
recording of both sound-recordings and audio-visual pictures.45
In applying the four criteria of the fair use doctrine, the court
found (1) that Universal Studios had admitted that there was no
economic harm, (2) that because Universal derives the majority of its
revenues from advertisements, the harm resulting from the
infringement was even more speculative, (3) that because the use
occurs within private homes, enforcement would be highly intrusive
and practically impossible, and (4) that although the use of the works
was substantial, it still constitutes fair use because “there is no
accompanying reduction in the market for ‘plaintiff's original
work.’”46
Universal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.47 The Ninth Circuit reversed, opining that:
There is no clear legislative language indicating that
home video recording is not within the exclusive rights
granted by § 106. The statute itself and the House and
Senate Reports accompanying the 1976 Act do not
provide for a broad based home use exception. There
was never a considered review of the home video
recording problem. The statements supporting the
district court’s conclusion hardly represent – when
considered in the content in which they were made and
in the context of the 20 year copyright revision process
– a firm expression of Congressional intent to carve out
a major exception to the copyright scheme.48

44

Id. at 448.
Id. at 447.
46
Id. at 450-54.
47
Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981).
48
Sony, 659 F.2d at 968.
45
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The court further dismissed the legislative history relied upon by
the District Court, suggesting that it was not intended to apply to home
video recording, because Congress was not considering home video
recording during its discussions on the 1971 amendment.49 As such,
the Ninth Circuit held that it was not fair use to record programs using
the Betamax, and remanded to the District Court for purposes of
developing appropriate remedies for copyright owners.50
Immediately following the court’s decision, legislation was
introduced addressing the problem.51 For example, one bill sought to
exempt all private, noncommercial home recording from any liability
for copyright infringement.52 A second bill sought to “grant users of
video cassette recorders a compulsory license with royalties to be paid
to copyright owners from the sale of machines and blank tapes.”53
“The immediate and widespread interest in the Sony case is
unprecedented in the history of copyright litigation.”54 Legislators
feared that millions of private citizens could be subject to damages and
that the manufacturers of the infringing products would go bankrupt.55
Now it was Sony’s turn to appeal, and the Supreme Court
accepted certiorari and heard the case of Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal Studios.56 The Supreme Court recognized that “the average
member of the public uses a VTR principally to record a program he
cannot view as it is being televised and then to watch it once at a later
time,” thereby acknowledging the practice of time shifting.57 However,
49

Id. at 968.
Id. at 972.
51
Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982) (statement of
Jack Valenti), available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
57
Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
50
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the Court noted that the Betamax was also used for “library building”
and for “commercial skipping.”58
Faced with this evidence, the court opined:
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this
case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment
with constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of
copyright for imposition of vicarious liability on such a
theory.59
The court also reasoned that the sale of copying equipment did not
constitute contributory infringement if the product was widely used for
non-infringing purposes.60 Because the Betamax allowed its customers
to record non-copyrighted works as well as copyrighted ones, Sony
could not be held liable for contributory copyright infringement.61
Furthermore, in determining whether the use of the Betamax
constituted fair use of the copyrighted works, the Supreme Court held
that time-shifting constituted a fair use of the product because it
enlarged the audience for the program.62
II.

LIFE AFTER SONY

We should all be as lucky as Universal Studios. The VCR became
an establishment in the homes of millions of American families, and
the movie studios recognized the ability to capitalize on this fact.63
The movie studios began to allow consumers to rent and purchase

58

Id.
Id. at 437.
60
Id. at 442.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 443.
63
von Lohmann, supra note 25, at 11.
59
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movies which created the home video market.64 According to Fred
von Lohmann, this market accounts for almost twice as much revenue
than that brought in by the box office today.65 The readily available
material for fair use recording served as the “bait that persuaded
American consumers to make the (initially) large investment in this
new fair use technology.”66
The Sony case represents the dilemma courts have been faced
with when technology and copyright laws collide. Today, P2P file
sharing technology could be called the Betamax of the 21st century
when looked at in a copyright-technology framework. Because of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sony, a new market opened – and
flourished – for the benefit of those trying to close that very market. If
the courts or the legislature were able to find a way to open new
markets for copyrighted music via P2P technology, perhaps the same
results would follow for the recording industries.
A. In re: Aimster
Courts are again being faced with a rift between technology and
copyright laws. The popularity of new devices such as iPods and MP3
players have fostered online file sharing networks which are being
used to fill these players with free, copyrighted music.
In 2003, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this very
issue in In re :Aimster.67 Numerous plaintiffs joined together to sue
Aimster, an online file sharing network, for contributory and vicarious
infringement of copyrights.68 The district court judge issued an
injunction which effectively shut Aimster down pending the resolution
of the suit, and the defendant appealed.69

64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
67
334 F. 3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
68
Id. at 645.
69
Id.
65
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The Seventh Circuit noted the high popularity of such online file
sharing networks among teenagers and young adults.70 The Court also
noted that if the music shared on these networks is copyrighted,
sharing digital copies of this music infringes copyright.71 Because of
the impossibility of suing all primary or direct infringers of
copyrighted works, the Court acknowledged that the law allows
rightholders to sue a contributor to the infringement instead.72
In determining whether Aimster was a contributory infringer of
copyrighted works, it was necessary for the Seventh Circuit to address
exactly how the software works. The software could be downloaded
for free from Aimster’s website and then the user registered on the
system by entering a password and user name.73 After doing so, he or
she could designate any other user as a “buddy” and was able to
communicate directly with them, attaching any files he or she wanted
to share with them.74 Because the songs were stored on the
individuals’ computers, Aimster, the court opined, could not be
considered a direct infringer of the copyrighted works.75
However, the court recognized that the ability of a service
provider like Aimster to prevent its customers from infringing is a
factor to be considered in determining whether the provider is a
contributory infringer.76 Further, the court held that when a supplier
like Aimster is offering a product or service that has non-infringing as
well as infringing uses, “some estimate of the respective magnitudes
of these uses is necessary for a finding of contributory
infringement.”77
In addressing the respective arguments of the parties, the court
noted that “to the recording industry, a single known infringing use
70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 646.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 648.
77
Id.
71
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brands the facilitator as a contributory infringer. To the Aimsters of
this world, a single, non-infringing use provides complete immunity
from liability. Neither is correct.”78 Because Aimster failed to provide
any evidence of non-infringing uses, the court assumed that there was
no such evidence.79 Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the
lower court and upheld the injunction.80
B. MGM v. Grokster
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in
MGM v. Grokster.81 In Grokster, copyright holders sued a software
distributor, alleging the distributor was liable for copyright
infringement because the software was intended to allow users to
infringe copyrighted works.82 The issue on review was under what
circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both lawful and
unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third
parties using the product – similar to the issues addressed in Sony.83
Grokster (and co-defendant Streamcast Networks, Inc.) distributed
free software which allowed the public to download music through
P2P file sharing networks.84 A study commissioned by MGM revealed
that 90% of all works downloaded from the Grokster software were
copyrighted works.85 Grokster argued, in Sony fashion, that its
software was capable of significant non-infringing uses; therefore, it
was not in violation of copyright law.86
While Grokster’s argument may have sounded in Sony fashion, a
clear distinction was made by the Supreme Court. When Grokster
78

Id. at 651.
Id. at 653.
80
Id. at 655-56.
81
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
82
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2766.
83
Id. at 2770.
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distributed its free software, it “clearly voiced the objective that
recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active
steps to encourage infringement.”87 In fact, when another file sharing
system – Napster – was shut down by the Court, Grokster and
Streamcast targeted its user base, going so far as to “introduce itself to
some potential advertisers as a company ‘which is similar to what
Napster was.’”88 It also “broadcast banner advertisements to users of
other Napster-compatible software, urging them to adopt its
[software].”89 A company email stated:
We have put this network in place so that when Napster
pulls the plug on their free service . . . or if the Court
orders them shut down prior to that . . . we will be
positioned to capture the flood of their 32 million users
that will be actively looking for an alternative.90
The defendants blatantly advertised that they sought to exploit the
illegal uses of their software and that their goal was to get sued
because “[i]ts the best way to get in the news.”91 No evidence was
presented that Grokster or Streamcast made any effort to prohibit its
users from downloading copyrighted materials.92
The Supreme Court discussed the case in the context of the Sony
decision and noted that in Sony, there was no evidence of intent by the
defendants to promote copyright infringement, and there, the only
possible way of imposing liability on Sony was for its distribution of
the Betamax.93 Further, because the VCR was “capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses,” the Supreme Court held
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the manufacturer could not be liable solely on the basis of its
distribution.94
The Supreme Court in Grokster declined to limit the Sony
decision; however, it noted that in Sony it was found that:
[i]f vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this
case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment
with constructive knowledge of the potential for
infringement. Thus, where evidence goes beyond a
product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be
put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions
directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article
rule will not preclude liability.95
The Supreme Court thereby adopted in Grokster this new
“inducement” test, whereby a defendant who actively induces
copyright infringement cannot claim protection under Sony.96
However, the Court limited its hoding to only those situations in which
actual inducement was shown, noting that:
mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual
infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a
distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to
product distribution, such as offering customers technical
support or product updates, support liability in themselves.
The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus
does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or
discourage innovation having a lawful promise.97
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Because the court found actual inducement and the evidence
showed actual infringement by the users of Grokster’s software, the
Court vacated the opinions of the lower courts and directed the case to
proceed consistent with its opinion.98
III. BMG MUSIC V. GONZALEZ
While courts have begun to hold companies who develop file
sharing software liable for contributory infringement, seemingly
cutting to the source of the problem, the epidemic still exists. More
and more file sharing networks have sprung up, and more and more
individuals, or direct infringers, can download the latest hits in a
matter of seconds. The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in BMG
Music v. Gonzalez should serve as notice to consumers and those who
participate in online file sharing activities that rightholders are now
targeting them, and are getting results.
BMG Music, Sony Entertainment, Inc., UMG Recordings, Inc.,
and Atlantic Recording Corp. (hereinafter, jointly “Recording
Companies”), brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against Cecilia Gonzalez due to her
alleged copyright infringement by downloading thirty songs onto her
computer.99 Gonzalez admitted that she infringed on the Recording
Companies’ copyrights by downloading thirty songs she did not
own.100 However, Gonzalez claimed that summary judgment was
inappropriate because the fair use defense was applicable to her
situation and she was entitled to the “innocent infringer” defense with
respect to damages.101
Gonzalez argued that her use of the songs was “fair” because (1)
she was sampling the music to determine which songs she would like
to purchase; (2) she owned many of the songs she downloaded; and (3)
98
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she did not cause the plaintiffs any financial harm by downloading the
thirty songs which formed the basis of the suit against her.102
However, the court rejected her “sampling” defense , noting the Ninth
Circuit rejected the same defense in a similar case.103 The court held
that “the cumulative effect of direct infringers, like Gonzalez, harms
the recording industry by reducing sales and ‘raising barriers’ to the
recording industry’s ‘entry into the market for digital downloading of
music.’”104 Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs on the infringement claim.105
Gonzalez sought to go to trial on the issue of damages and
contended that the statutory damages attributable to her were too high
because she was an “innocent infringer.”106 In “innocent infringer”
situations, the court may award damages of only $200 where the
infringer proves that she “was not aware and had no reason to believe
that . . . her acts constituted infringement.”107 However, the court
noted that the “innocent infringer” defense is inapplicable in situations
where a notice of copyright appeared on the recordings to which the
infringer had access.108 Notice of the copyrights of the thirty songs at
issue here was located on the compact discs sold in stores, not in
Gonzalez’s possession; however, a question of fact existed as to
whether Gonzalez had access to these discs.109 Although this question
of fact existed, the plaintiffs needed only to prove that the notice was
“in circulation and available to the infringer.”110 The Court then held:
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[B]ecause it is undisputed that the copyrights of the 30
songs at issue were properly noticed on the covers of the
CDs, there is no question of fact as to whether Gonzalez
had ‘access’ to notice of the copyrights. Indeed, Gonzalez
(sic) admits that she and her husband have legally
purchased over 200 CDs. To allow Gonzalez to assert this
defense based on her ignorance would eviscerate copyright
protection and the old adage that ‘ignorance is no defense
to the law.’ This Court thus holds that she is not entitled to
the innocent infringer defense and awards the Record
Companies $ 22,500 (30 songs times the minimum
statutory penalty ($ 750)).111
The relatively short District Court opinion lacks the reasoning and
factual background of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez.112 In
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, readers learn that Gonzalez downloaded
more than 1,370 copyrighted songs and kept them on her computer
until she was caught.113 The Seventh Circuit recognized that keeping
these songs on her computer was not a form of time-shifting in the
likes of Sony, because “a copy of music downloaded, played and
retained and one’s hard drive for future use is a direct substitute for a
purchased copy without the benefit of a license fee paid to the
rightholder.”114 The court noted that the premise of the Sony decision
was that the broadcast was licensed for one transmission and thus one
viewing; therefore, this “time-shifting” of this single viewing
constituted fair use.115
In addressing her fair use defense, the Seventh Circuit realized
that because of the circumstances of the case, the only avenue for
Gonzalez was to argue that her use of the songs did not affect the
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potential market for or the value of the copyrighted works.116
Gonzalez attempted to prove that her activities were beneficial to the
recording industry because they served as advertising for the
rightholders.117 However, the court noted that “as file sharing has
increased over the last four years, the sales of recorded music have
dropped by almost 30%.”118 Faced with this statistic, the court could
not bring itself to believe that downloading copies of copyrighted
music constituted fair use.119
Important to those engaged in file sharing activity is the court’s
statement, in dicta, about the songs BMG sought compensation for.
The court reasoned that:
[A]lthough BMG Music sought damages for only the 30
songs that Gonzalez concedes she has never purchased, all
1000+ of her downloads violated the statute. All created
copies of an entire work. All undermined the means by
which authors seek to profit. Gonzalez proceeds as if the
authors’ only interest were in selling compact discs
containing collections of works. Not so; there is a market
in ways to introduce potential customers to music.120
The court recognized that there were other options available for
Gonzalez to sample music if she merely wanted to sample it, such as
listening to live-stream radio over the internet and paying a fee for the
right to do so.121 Had she done this, the court opined, the authors of the
works would have received royalties from the broadcasters and it
would have reduced the risk of consumers not purchasing actual music
from a retail store.122 Also important to the court was that in these
116
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alternative options, the song does not remain on the listener’s
computer.123 Therefore, the court held that:
[W]ith all these means available to consumers who want
to choose where to spend their money, downloading full
copies of copyrighted material without compensation to
authors cannot be deemed ‘fair use.’ People such as
Gonzalez cannot ask courts to second-guess the market
and call wholesale copying ‘fair use’ if they think that
authors err in understanding their own economic interests
or that Congress erred in granting authors the rights in the
copyright statute.124
The court then upheld the award of damages in the amount of
$22,500 and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
The Seventh Circuit also upheld the District Court’s ruling on
Gonzalez’s “innocent infringer” claim. MGM was awarded statutory
damages on summary judgment in this case. Under 17 U.S.C
504(c)(1), a plaintiff may recover damages between $750 and $30,000
for each work infringed.125 Here, MGM sought the minimum $750 for
each of the thirty songs Gonzalez downloaded, did not own, and kept
on her computer. In rejecting Gonzalez’s argument, Seventh Circuit
found that she was not an “innocent infringer” because one cannot be
held to such status if a copyright notice appeared on a copy of the
copyrighted work.126 While the downloaded songs lacked such notice,
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that Gonzalez
clearly had access to compact discs with such notices, and had she
inquired, she could have readily found out.127 Accordingly, the trial
court’s grant of damages on summary judgment was upheld.128
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While Gonzalez raises no new issues in terms of copyright law, it
does have a few interesting comments in dicta that could serve to
notify consumers or potential infringers exactly how this court will
rule in the future. Matt Schruers and Jonathan Band, in their article
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, offer three such scenarios.
Schruers and Band argue that Gonzalez limits the landmark Sony
case to its facts, holding that time shifting for a single use constitutes
fair use while at the same time ignoring the fact that a great number of
people “library” or “archive” video cassettes.129 This limitation “calls
into doubt – at least in the Seventh Circuit – the activity of ‘librarying’
or ‘archiving’ video enabled by both the videocassette recorders and
personal video recorders.”130
Second, Schruers and Band note that the Seventh Circuit found
that Gonzalez was not using these songs for “non-profit” use;
however, she was not selling these songs, nor was she gaining any
other sort of profit from them, “unless the court considers listening to
music a ‘profit.’”131 If the court was referring to this personal use not
equating to “non-profit educational usage,” Schruers and Band urge
the Court to clarify its ruling in this respect.132
Lastly, Schruers and Band criticize the Seventh Circuit’s “verbal
attack on direct infringers” by equating downloading music to
shoplifting.133 They note that the Supreme Court had previously
clearly distinguished between infringement and theft because
“interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft,
conversion or fraud.”134 This equation by the Seventh Circuit, they
argue, “constitutes an unfortunate trend in judicial decisions and
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policy discussions of blurring the significant distinctions between
intellectual property and tangible property.”135
Schruers and Band effectively display the importance Gonzalez
plays not only in terms of the file sharing community, but also in terms
of its relation to Sony. While the distinctions between the two cases
are obvious (i.e., direct infringers vs. contributory infringers),
Gonzalez offers a look at how courts are interpreting new P2P
technology in relation to the Sony decision.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
A. Is New Legislation Needed?
In Sony, the District Court began its opinion by recognizing the
importance and ramifications of the new Betamax or video-recording
technology and refused to “undertake the role of a government
commission or legislative body exploring and evaluating all the uses
and consequences and the videotape recorder.”136 The court seemed to
suggest (or cry out for) the need for legislative action or assistance,
similar to the cry for legislative action in Wilkins when the photocopier
made its way into the copyright arena. With the advent of P2P
technology, a cry for help should sound from both sides of the crisis,
and it should be heard and addressed by the legislature. This
technology offers enormous and far-reaching (literally) benefits to its
users; however, it has fostered a world of copyright infringement
which continues to grow.
The Supreme Court accepted the time shifting argument of
recording, watching, and erasing recorded, copyrighted materials.137
However, does anyone – consumer, producer, copyright holder,
Supreme Court Justice – really believe this scenario to be the norm
amongst the video-recording public?
135
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So how did the Sony Court rule the way it did? Was the Supreme
Court searching for a reason to allow the use of this copyrightinfringing technology? Did the Court recognize the economic impact
it would have and find a way to keep it in the market? Did the Sony
Court know the ends it wanted to reach, and did it search (or stretch?)
to find the means necessary to reach those ends? When compared to
the decisions in Aimster, Grokster, and Gonzalez, it seems the answer
to the preceding questions is “yes.”
Copyright must be able to change with the advent of new
technologies.138 “Prior to the introduction of [P2P] technology,
copyright infringement via the Internet was arguably a manageable
issue . . .”139 File sharing represents the latest and most pressing
challenges to copyright law in recent years. However, courts have not
yet been willing to embrace this new technology and allow its
dissemination when infringement is prevalent, and with good reason.
Gonzalez’s actions were clearly in violation of the Copyright Act and
its purpose to protect the interests of authors, artists, and scientists in
their original works.
However, Gonzalez is merely a grain of sand on the beach of
online file sharers engaging in copyright infringement everyday. It
would require a Herculean effort by the courts and the music industry
to eliminate each and every individual infringer like Gonzalez. On the
other hand, this problem cannot persist and grow to the point of
creating irreparable harm to the music industry, record labels, and
individual artists.
Perhaps Congress should act, and act now, to find a solution to
this crisis and re-establish the balance between technological
advancement and copyright protections. However, any Congressional
138
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stance on the matter should be “progressive” and strong, and leave no
room for debate.140 To be weak on the matter “would result in an
imbalanced solution to the P2P debate and will thereby weaken the
fundamental goals of copyright law.”141
Much of the legislation currently proposed in Congress fails to
adequately address the balance which is the subject of this article –
that of rights in copyrighted material and technology.142 In 2002,
Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal) proposed the Peer-to-Peer
Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211). This act (1) enables copyright
owners to use technology to deter or prevent the unauthorized
distribution of copyrighted works over the Internet, (2) grants
copyright holders the right to use any technology at their disposal to
disable, interfere, or block the distribution of copyrighted works, and
(3) limits liability for the impairment of personal computers, as long as
the economic loss suffered by the user is less than fifty dollars.143
Notably, Berman’s constituent base is Hollywood.144
Berman’s proposal fails to realize how prevalent the use of P2P
technology is today. While his proposed legislation offers a seemingly
one-sided solution to the problem, it does not recognize the
improbability of curtailing this widespread use. Only when the
recording industries, internet service providers and software
distributors come together to form a workable solution will this
technology, and this industry, find a way to grow and prosper together.
B. Alternative Compensation Schemes
This, and other proposed P2P legislation, offers a bleak outlook
for P2P technology and the balance between this type of media
140
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technology and copyright sought by the Sony Court.145 What, then, are
acceptable Congressional responses? Alternative compensation to the
recording industry may be one way to get around this evolving
problem. John M. Moye argues for a “compulsory licensing scheme,
which would set a rate at which copyrighted works would have to be
licensed over the Internet.”146 Under this type of system, Congress
would have the ability to guarantee compensation to copyright owners
while at the same time allowing this information to be disseminated on
the Internet.147 Such a solution was originally proposed for Universal
Studios in Sony by the Ninth Circuit.148 It suggested that “a continuing
royalty pursuant to a . . . compulsory license may very well be an
acceptable resolution of the impasse between the VCR manufacturers
and the film companies.”149 If Congress were to implement such a
plan, Moye argues, it would force the two sides of the conflict to work
together and ensure compensation to the copyright owners.150 If the
alternative is to receive no compensation for their works, copyright
owners may be willing to discuss such a plan.151
Michael Rucci, in his article entitled Congress Wants to Give the
RIAA Control of Your iPod: How the Induce Act Chills Innovation and
Abrogates Sony, has proposed a different alternative compensation
plan.152 Under his plan, he argues that because file sharing networks
will always exist, the record labels should adjust to market rather than
taking their aggression out on their customers or lobbying Congress to
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make changes to existing copyright law.153 One solution he cites is for
each internet service provider (ISP) to ask their users if they want to
pay an additional $1 per month for legal access to as many MP3s as
they desire.154 Then, these ISPs could track downloads and distribute
revenues directly to the artists based on their popularity.155 A solution,
he argues, “which gives incentive to the creation of new works is not
antithetical to the Copyright Clause and supports a free market
economy.”156
Rucci’s cited alternative seems the better fit to deal with the
evolving technologies which promote or enable copyright
infringement. Under his plan, individuals have the option of either (1)
being a legitimate downloader of music with unlimited access to
copyrighted works, or (2) infringing where known avenues of
legitimate access to music are available. Further, his plan would allow
appropriate compensation to the authors of the copyrighted works. His
plan is the closest step yet to achieving a workable and sustainable
balance between technology and copyright infringement. Under either
Moye’s or Rucci’s plans, the hope is that both sides of the conflict will
work together to achieve a solution – a definite step in the right
direction.
C. Compulsory Alternative Compensation
Rucci’s plan offers an interesting alternative solution; however,
perhaps a compulsory alternative compensation system for all internet
users, the proceeds of which would be applied to offset the yearly
losses incurred by copyright owners, could provide a more
comprehensive – and mandatory – guarantee for copyright owners.
According to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),
the recording industry loses yearly, on average, $4.2 billion worldwide
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as a result of copyright infringement.157 Americans – 205,326,680 to
be exact – use the Internet.158 This number also accounts for 20.1% of
all Internet usage worldwide.159 If all American Internet users were
required to pay an additional $0.50 per month (half of that proposed
by Michael Rucci) to offset the losses incurred by the recording
industry – in exchange for unlimited Internet music access – the
recording industry would receive $1,231,960,080 yearly. This would
account for over 29% of all losses suffered by the recording industry
as a result of online file sharing – more than the percentage of
Americans using the Internet.
While obstacles would certainly exists in the implementation of
any alternative compensation system, these systems seem to offer the
simplest, and most effective, way of allowing P2P technology to
continue while actively protecting copyrights in original works. A
small fee for unlimited access to copyrighted works could be
appealing to the file sharing community, especially with a guarantee
that those users would not be subject to prosecution or liability for
copyright infringement.
V. CONCLUSION
Technological advancements have forced owners of copyrighted
material to pursue legal action against individual infringers – and they
are getting results, evidence by the Seventh Circuit’s Gonzalez case.
Until a solution to the file sharing problem evolves, there will continue
to be direct and contributory infringers of copyrighted work.
Addressing this problem, while not upsetting consumer innovation and
the economic impact that this sort of technology can have serves as the
greatest obstacle to come for copyright owners.
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Legislation implementing an alternative compensation system
certainly seems to be the most effective way to curtail online copyright
infringement. However, any legislation would need to be thorough and
address both sides of the conflict. If legislation were implemented
which serves only to penalize individual infringers, those infringers
would inevitably go further “underground” and seek alternative
methods of sharing or downloading music. The public has tasted the
benefits of online music access. Its appetite will not be easy to subdue.
The Boston Strangler is back, and alive and well in the eyes of the
recording and motion picture industries. While the decisions in
Grokster, Aimster, and Gonzalez were correctly decided under existing
law, it is the effects and benefits the public and to the motion picture
industry derived from the Sony decision that should be the goal when
dealing with this new dissemination technology. If the market adjusts
and the technological advancement continues to create new avenues
for dissemination of music and video in a profitable and legal way for
both rightholders in copyrighted material and the public, it is hopeful
that both sides of the conflict will be satisfied.
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